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Patient health data is heavily regulated and 
sensitive. Patients will sometimes falsify data to avoid 
embarrassment resulting in misdiagnoses and even 
death. Existing research to explain this phenomenon 
is scarce with little more than attitudes and intents 
modeled. Similarly, health data disclosure research 
has only applied existing theories with additional 
constructs for the healthcare context. We argue that 
health data has a fundamentally different cost/benefit 
calculus than the non-health contexts of traditional 
privacy research. By separating the probability of 
disclosure risks and benefits from the impact of that 
disclosure, it is easier to understand and interpret 
health data disclosure. In a study of 1590 patients 
disclosing health information electronically, we find 
that the benefits of disclosure are more difficult to 
conceptualize than the impact of the risk. We validate 
this using both a stated and objective (mouse tracking) 
measure of patient lying. 
1. Introduction  
Information disclosed over the Internet via 
websites, mobile applications, and other Internet-
connected devices is the source of incredible benefit 
and risk to consumers. The mobile application market 
alone is expected to reach over $366 billion by 2027 
[1]. The valuable personal information disclosed 
through mobile apps (and many other Internet-
connected sources) motivated at least 1,923 data 
breaches in 2020 including 37 billion records 
compromised [2].  
As a result, regulators have become increasingly 
active in passing legislation to help consumers 
maintain the value derived from disclosing sensitive 
information while reducing the risk that it will be 
exposed. For example, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is 
arguably one of the earliest and most detailed types of 
regulations regarding information privacy [3]. 
HIPAA was designed, in part, to prevent 
insurance providers from using certain patient medical 
history data to charge higher premiums. HIPAA is 
executed in the features provided by electronic health 
records (EHR) systems that store and transfer patient 
health data among clinicians who need it to determine 
accurate diagnoses and provide appropriate care. 
There is a real need for accurate health information 
disclosure since it is used quite literally in “life or 
death” situations. However, some have argued that 
health data is also the most sensitive type of personal 
information since it can lead to great embarrassment 
[4, 5], increased insurance costs [3], and even to 
patients being held “hostage” when life-giving 
medical devices such as pacemakers are hacked [6]. 
These risks cause many patients to lie to their 
healthcare providers about their health histories which 
can lead to misdiagnoses [4, 7]. Misdiagnoses are the 
most frequent type of medical error and are estimated 
to cause up to 80,000 deaths in the United States each 
year [8]. 
While some researchers have attempted to explain 
patient attitudes toward EHR systems that request their 
personal information [9], the adoption of medical 
devices that collect personal information [10], and 
willingness to disclose health data [11] and allow viral 
contact tracing [5], the theoretical contributions 
available from the general information privacy 
literature [12, 13] have not been well-applied to the 
healthcare domain. For example, existing research 
does not measure true patient health disclosure in the 
presence of actual perceived risks, but instead utilizes 
hypothetical scenarios or measures intentions or 
attitudes only. Similarly, patient health data disclosure 
in realistic scenarios has not been examined even 
though the importance of true disclosure data has been 
highlighted in general information privacy research 
[14, 15]. Therefore, it is more likely that existing 
research is biased towards outcomes that patients 
believe they would adopt rather than what they would 
actually do when their health is on the line. This bias 
is, perhaps, the greatest threat to valid information 
privacy research [13, 16, 17]. 
Another opportunity left by existing research is 
that the theories used to explain consumer information 
disclosure are often “dragged and dropped” into the 
patient health data context. Although researchers 
typically add new variables relevant to the healthcare 





domain of interest, by and large, most have not 
explored the assumptions of these theories to posit 
how the fundamental relationships might change. To 
address this opportunity, we return to the “roots” of 
information disclosure theory which explain our 
progression from beliefs to attitudes to intentions to 
behaviors: the theory of planned behavior [18].  
To demonstrate our theory, we developed and 
validated a revised scale measuring privacy calculus 
theory [19] in which the perceived probability of both 
disclosure risks and benefits is distinguished from 
their respective perceived impact. We test this scale in 
a unique methodology where participants are deceived 
(with IRB approval) to believe they are participating 
in a medical study about indicators of depression and 
anxiety in which they will need to provide certain data 
concerning their medical history. Unaware of the true 
purpose of the study, participants believe that real data 
is necessary and, thus, believe there is a legitimate 
level of risk that they could experience embarrassment 
if their data is misused. Therefore, we measured actual 
information disclosure as opposed to attitudes or 
intentions alone. Furthermore, in addition to a stated 
response, we used a novel approach to measure lying 
that has recently been validated in IS research based 
on mouse cursor movements [20]. 
In summary, we find that the likelihood of 
benefits of accurate information disclosure (e.g. 
improved mental health) are more difficult to 
conceptualize and perceive—causing them to have a 
lower effect on accurate information disclosure than 
traditionally found in non-health related contexts. As 
a result, the perceived impact of risks (e.g. 
embarrassment) plays a larger role in the healthcare 
context relative to non-health related contexts.  
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Privacy Calculus 
To aid in the risk/reward battle, academic research 
has progressed with a variety of theories explaining 
why, or with whom, consumers decide to share their 
personal information. Each theory is useful in specific 
contexts but limited in others. In general, these 
theories can be separated into one of two categories. 
The first are those based on choice theory [21] which 
assumes that individuals are rational actors who prefer 
outcomes with greater net value. Their behaviors and 
choices involve a tradeoff (a.k.a. “calculus”) between 
the expected benefit minus the cost of decision 
outcomes. Privacy calculus theory [19, 22] is the 
adaptation of rational choice theory in the Internet 
information privacy context. This has been the 
dominant theory used to explain consumer 
information disclosure decisions. 
Figure 1 visualizes privacy calculus theory. There 
are three to five primary constructs included in most 
studies based on this theory. In its most basic form, 
perceived disclosure privacy risks (the costs) reduce 
intention to disclose accurate information while 
perceived disclosure benefits increase intention. Dinev 
and Hart [19] were among the first to develop this 
theory and included two other covariates: trust in the 
transaction partner and privacy concerns. The latter 
refers to the more general privacy concerns about all 
companies (often defined using [23]) while the former 
refers to the specific privacy risk associated with the 
transaction partner in context. Although trust is a 
unique construct, it is often omitted when using a brief 
measure of privacy calculus theory because of its high 
correlation with perceived disclosure risk. 
Besides rational choice theory [21], privacy 
calculus theory is also based on the theory of planned 
behavior (TPB) [18] which posits that behavioral 
intentions lead to actual behavior which is omitted 
from the original model. 
 
 
Figure 1. Core Privacy Calculus Theory 
2.2. Alternatives to Privacy Calculus 
Despite its usefulness and accuracy in many 
contexts, privacy calculus has also been criticized for 
not explaining why many consumers who claim to be 
very concerned about privacy still decide to disclose 
seemingly large amounts of personal data for very 
small rewards [16]. Termed the “privacy paradox”, 
this criticism has led to the second general category of 
information privacy research: providing various 
explanations of “bounded” rational behavior. These 
studies [e.g., 14, 17, 24, 25-27] adapt various theories 
from behavioral economics intended to explain 
various phenomena of consumers behaving in ways 
that seem irrational.  
For example, prospect theory [28, 29] is used to 
explain how information disclosure behavior is not 
consistent at all levels of disclosure risk and reward 
[14, 24, 27]. An extension of prospect theory, 
hyperbolic discounting [30] is used to explain how the 
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temporal order of when information disclosure costs 
versus benefits are realized can impact a consumer’s 
information disclosure rationality [14, 25]. Others 
have explained this paradox simply as an illusion of 
control [31] where consumers do make a rational 
decision based on what they believe to be true and their 
behavior is only irrational because they do not 
understand the extent of the risks. Lastly, of note, 
another explanation comes from theory on the 
elaboration likelihood model of persuasion [32] where 
illogical information disclosure decisions are made 
essentially because consumers are “lazy” information 
processors who are either too busy or distracted at the 
time of disclosure to pay attention or research the full 
extent of privacy risks [33, 34]. 
Each of these alternative theories have merit and 
clearly the information disclosure phenomenon is a 
complex and multi-faceted issue that is influenced at 
many levels including general concerns, the specific 
disclosure context, and psychological state of the 
discloser. However, the rational choice-based privacy 
calculus theory may be more efficacious than it seems 
by taking a closer look at the perceived disclosure risk 
and benefit constructs. 
2.3. Taking a Closer Look at TPB 
As mentioned above, we can learn more from a 
(re)visit of the TPB and its companion theory of 
reasoned action (TRA) [35]. These theories explain 
that an individual’s attitude and perceptions, subject 
norms, and perceived behavioral control lead to 
intentions and actual behaviors. From this lens, the 
perceived risks and benefits of disclosure represent 
attitudes and perceptions referred to in TPB/TRA.  
Ajzen [18] notes that our attitudes and perceptions 
regarding a specific task are largely based on our 
confidence that we can realize or accomplish that task. 
If we are confident that an intended behavior will yield 
the outcomes we are interested in, then that attitude 
will have a greater impact on our intentions and 
behavior. This theorizing was based on Bandura [36] 
concept of self-efficacy which explains how our 
confidence in achieving a task explains why we try 
harder (a.k.a. “cope”) to achieve that task. 
However, TPB/TRA is based on important 
boundary conditions. The one most relevant to our 
point: the effect of perceptions on intentions and 
behaviors depends on the degree of specificity of those 
perceptions [37]. In other words, the easier it is to 
conceptualize or perceive the specific coping path 
from the intended behavior to the intended outcome, 
the more likely that our perceptions will lead to 
intentions and behaviors. 
To understand this assumption, consider a 
scenario where a consumer decides to download a 
mobile application to get restaurant recommendations. 
After installing the app, the consumer is prompted to 
disclose data that will be used to personalize the app 
and improve its value. This opportunity to transact 
with the provider offers both a risk/cost and a benefit. 
Based on our prior arguments, the easier it is for the 
consumer to conceptualize the specific risks and 
benefits of this transaction, the more likely those 
perceptions will accurately explain their intentions and 
behaviors. In other words, if the consumer cannot 
determine whether the app will provide her with good 
or bad restaurant recommendations, then her perceived 
disclosure benefits will have a weaker effect on her 
intention to disclose her data. Similarly, if she cannot 
accurately determine the level of privacy risk 
associated with the disclosure, then her perceived 
disclosure risk will have a weaker effect on her 
behavioral intention. 
This effect is not hard to find in existing privacy 
calculus research. Consider the study by Keith, et al. 
[38] who examined whether subjects would disclose 
personal data to a mobile app designed to give 
personalized recommendations. The authors 
attempted to deceive participants into believing that 
they were being recruited to beta test an app being 
developed by a local software company rather than the 
researchers. Because of this uncertainty, subjects had 
a difficult time assessing the true nature of the privacy 
risk. On the other hand, it was much easier for subjects 
to assess whether the app would be beneficial because 
it provided clear screens demonstrating the app 
features. As a result, perceived disclosure risk had 
only a very small effect on actual information 
disclosure relative to perceived disclosure benefits.  
A review of privacy calculus research generally 
supports this reasoning. The effect of perceived risks 
and benefits varies depending on their respective 
specificity. Mobile app disclosure studies often 
provide screenshots of the app but little information 
about the privacy risk—causing perceived risk to have 
a smaller effect. 
2.4. Separating Probability from Impact 
There are several ways to demonstrate the 
importance of perception specificity and health data 
provides a nice juxtaposition to more commonly 
studied disclosure contexts. To add specificity to the 
cost and benefit perceptions of information disclosure, 
we can break each evaluation into its two fundamental 
parts: probability and impact [28]. Current privacy 
calculus measurements combine these concepts in 
benefit and cost perceptions. Table 1 lists some sample 
measures used in prior research [15, 39]: 
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Table 1. Sample Risk and Benefit Measures 
Perceived Disclosure Benefit 
The [mobile app name] can provide me with personalized 
services tailored to my activity context. 
The [mobile app name] can provide me with more relevant 
information tailored to my preferences or personal 
interests. 
The [mobile app name] can provide me with the kind of 
information or service that I might like. 
Perceived Disclosure Risks 
Providing [mobile app provider] with my personal 
information would involve many unexpected problems. 
It would be risky to disclose my personal information to 
[mobile app provider]. 
There would be high potential for loss in disclosing my 
personal information to [mobile app provider]. 
 
Based on economic risk theory, the perceived 
disclosure benefit is a combination of both the 
probability of that benefit being obtained and the 
impact of that benefit. For example, a mobile app that 
provides driving directions has a high probability, but 
low impact compared to a dating app which has a 
lower probability and higher impact of a benefit. By 
measuring probability and impact distinctly, it is 
possible to explain intentions and behaviors with 
greater accuracy, and therefore find fewer outcomes 
that appear to be “irrational.” Therefore, we specify a 
privacy calculus model with these details as visualized 
in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Expanded Privacy Calculus 
 Again, the key distinction of this model from 
traditional privacy calculus is that perceived 
disclosure privacy risks are formed by a combination 
of both risk probability (RPR) and risk impact (RIM). 
Perceived disclosure benefits are based on benefit 
probability (BPR) and benefit impact (BIM). Although 
we model risk and benefit as second-order formative 
constructs, the first-order sub-constructs are still 
reflective as in prior research [15, 19, 39]. Finally, 
based on prior research [15], we replace the intent to 
disclose information with actual information 
disclosure to eliminate the possibility of the privacy 
paradox confounding results [16]. We note that 
“actual” information disclosure scopes out the 
inclusion of false information disclosure which does 
not provide the same risks and benefits of factual data. 
2.5. Health Data Hypotheses 
The theoretical model in Figure 2 is intended to 
be more specific than traditional privacy calculus 
which has the added benefit of allowing us to infer 
how health data is unique from other contexts. The 
primary risks of disclosing personal health 
information include embarrassment, pain (of 
treatment), and financial loss (due to insurance 
premiums) [4, 7]. The probability of these risks may 
vary and still be difficult to conceptualize. However, 
whereas the mobile app context leaves the discloser 
with no idea of what risks she may face, in the 
healthcare context, a patient has a more concrete idea 
of whether they will face embarrassment or pain—
making the perception more specific and more 
strongly related to actual disclosure.  
Furthermore, by law, patients are informed of 
their HIPAA rights before every treatment making 
them more aware of the risk probabilities and thus, 
also increasing the specificity of the construct. In 
summary, we hypothesize the overall effect of 
perceived privacy risk based on privacy calculus 
theory and the distinct effects of probability versus 
impact based on the specificity assumption of 
TRA/TPB: 
 
H1a: Perceived disclosure risk probability (RPR) 
decreases actual information disclosure 
 
H1b: Perceived disclosure risk impact (RIM) 
decreases actual information disclosure 
 
Conversely, relative to more general disclosure 
contexts, the perceived disclosure benefits of health 
information are likely less specific. For example, 
downloading an app that guides its user through a city 
or theme park would have benefits that are relatively 
easy to conceptualize and predict. On the other hand, 
disclosing health background data to a clinician is 
intended to help them provide better care and the 
discloser to eventually have improved health. 
However, that improvement is not as immediate as a 
park directions app and many other factors influence 
the likelihood that they will get better health like the 
competency of the clinician and willingness of the 
Page 4839
discloser to adhere to clinician recommendations.  
Therefore, while the probability of receiving 
health benefits may be difficult to conceptualize, the 
impact of those benefits would still be similarly more 
difficult to conceptualize depending on the healthcare 
context. Similar to H1, based on privacy calculus 
theory, we hypothesize: 
 
H2a: Perceived disclosure benefit probability 
(BPR) increases actual information disclosure 
 
H2b: Perceived disclosure benefit impact (BIM) 
increases actual information disclosure 
 
In summary, we model and hypothesize a more 
specified version of privacy calculus and explore how 
the healthcare context may differ from traditional 
contexts, such as mobile apps, where the effect of 
perceived disclosure benefits tend to outweigh 
perceived disclosure risks [15, 39]. 
3. Methodology 
To test our theoretical model, we needed to create 
a realistic scenario where participants would believe 
that they needed to disclose factual health data in the 
presence of real risk. Hypothetical scenarios or 
disclosure intentions are prone to bias and more 
generally lacking in information privacy research [13] 
and health privacy research in particular. Therefore, 
with IRB approval, we modified consent to deceive 
participants into believing we were a team of 
clinicians and medical researchers studying mental 
health and that we wanted to measure their depression 
and anxiety to understand how their personal health 
history was related.  
Data for our experiment was collected through a 
survey instrument posted on Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk), which received nearly 1600 responses. 
Survey participants were compensated $1.50 for a 
completed survey. The downside of this design is that 
participants did not have a personal interaction 
(allowing the potential for direct embarrassment) with 
any clinician. However, this was deemed acceptable to 
prevent the participants from knowing that they were 
actually participating in an academic study about 
information privacy. Submitting health history in an 
electronic format is commonplace in today’s EHR 
systems [40]. 
The survey was created in Qualtrics to feel like a 
medical intake form as opposed to an academic 
research study by removing any reference to the 
sponsoring university and eliminating the consent 
form. 
3.1. Measurement 
Respondents initially answered 16 questions from 
a commonly used depression/anxiety scale [41] 
including measures from the past two weeks, such as 
restless sleep, talking less than usual, or feeling 
fearful. By using a common mental health scale used 
by many primary care physicians, participants may 
have been more likely to believe the false scenario. 
Attention check questions were inserted to help 
identify invalid responses.  
Next, participants were asked questions about 
their personal health history and wellness behavior 
including height, weight, the frequency of alcohol 
consumed, illegal drug usage, prescription or 
nonprescription abuse, smoking, sexual activity, 
physical exercise and sleep. These data points were 
selected to provide a range of sensitivity to allow most 
participants to have at least some level of sensitivity to 
provide this information.  
Lying, or the accuracy of their disclosure was 
measured in two ways. First, we used a novel mouse-
tracking methodology validated in recent IS research 
[20] based on the distance, speed, and change of 
directions of the mouse used to complete the data entry 
form. Mouse tracking has been demonstrated to 
indicate a level of cognitive distress [20] interpreted as 
lying [42]. Individuals wishing to duplicate this study 
should ensure that participants have JavaScript 
enabled in order to capture as much usable mouse 
tracking data as possible. Second, subjects were then 
shown a statement informing them of the true purpose 
of the study to investigate the human tendency to 
misrepresent sensitive health information. Subjects 
were assured that they would receive full credit for 
participation regardless of whether they exaggerated 
or misrepresented prior responses. They were also 
assured that their responses were anonymous and 
impossible to trace back to them. The participants then 
indicated, on a scale spanning -5 to 5, how much they 
had over or understated their responses in the previous 
section, with -5 being a gross understatement, 0 being 
exactly accurate, and 5 being a gross overstatement. 
Their original answer to each question was also shown 
to help them recall and more accurately rate their 
original accuracy. When modeling, we use the 
absolute value of this response to control for lying in 
either direction. 
Next, participants responded to a Likert-style 
scale that was loosely based on existing privacy 
calculus research [15, 19, 27, 39] but generated from 
the ground up for this study. The process by which 
these questions were designed and validated is 
outlined in section 3.1.1. 
Social desirability was also measured using an 
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existing scale [43] because it is a known covariate 
explaining whether respondents would act in a way 
that is deemed socially acceptable such as responding 
truthfully on a medical intake form. Finally, 
participants were asked for demographic information 
including income, gender, age, ethnicity, and 
education level, and debriefed on the true purpose of 
the study. 
 
3.1.1. Content Adequacy Tests: Validly measuring 
the probability of a benefit/risk distinctly from the 
impact is difficult. These factors are highly correlated 
making it difficult to achieve discriminant validity. 
Our intent was to create a scale that would generalize 
to most health data contexts including mental health. 
Therefore, to establish content validity [44], we began 
by meeting with three clinicians (a doctor, physician’s 
assistant, and nurse) with experience measuring 
depression and anxiety to ask them how they would 
characterize the impacts versus probability of the risks 
and benefits of disclosing health data.  
To verify content validity, we used a technique 
known as a content adequacy test (CAT) [see complete 
details in 44]. This test involved four rounds of data 
collection and scale revisions. These data collections 
were based on 100-180 MTurk master workers each 
with no restrictions by any demographic. They were 
simply invited to participate in a mental health study, 
given construct definitions of RIM, RPR, BIM, and 
BPR, and asked to indicate how much each scale item 
seemed to measure each of the four constructs. The 
process is complete when a repeated measures analysis 
of variance test with contrasts indicates that each scale 
item measures its intended construct significantly 
more than every other construct. The final scale items 
are summarized in Table 2. The scale for general 
privacy concern was drawn from prior research [39]. 
 
Table 2. Final Scale Items for RIM, RPR, BIM, BPR 
BIM1: Diagnoses made from the information I just shared 
could have a positive impact on my health. 
BIM2: Diagnoses made from the information I just shared 
could help me receive better healthcare. 
BIM3: Diagnoses made from the information I just shared 
could help me manage my health. 
BPR1: It is likely that the information I just shared will 
help a healthcare provider make an accurate diagnosis. 
BPR2: It is likely that the information I just shared will 
help a healthcare provider understand my symptoms. 
BPR3: It is likely that the information I just shared will 
help a healthcare provider accurately classify my 
conditions. 
RIM1: If an unethical person accesses the information I 
just disclosed, it could cause me embarrassment. 
RIM2: If an unethical person accesses the information I 
just disclosed, it could cost me a lot of money. 
RIM3: If an unethical person accesses the information I 
just disclosed, it could require a lot of effort to resolve the 
problems that could arise. 
RIM4: If an unethical person accesses the information I 
just disclosed, the consequences to me could be high. 
RPR1: It is likely that an unethical person will obtain 
access to the information I just disclosed. 
RPR2: It is likely that the information I just disclosed will 
not be kept safe. 
RPR3: It is likely that the information I just disclosed will 
be shared with third parties I did not anticipate. 
 
3.1.2. Mouse Tracking Data: As mentioned above, 
participants' mouse movements were tracked by 
proprietary software designed to detect and flag 
fraudulent behavior. There were multiple variables 
recorded, such as the distance traveled by the mouse 
tracker, the speed at which it moved, and the total time 
a respondent took to answer the question. Z-scores 
were then computed for each of these variables in 
order to standardize the scale within each participant. 
Thus, responses that included mouse movements that 
were larger, took longer, or included more changes in 
direction, indicate greater cognitive distress and 
possible lying. Because of technical incompatibilities 
(e.g. people who took the survey over a mobile device 
or had JavaScript disabled), mouse tracking data was 
available for only 591 of the 1590 responses. 
Participants were not informed that their mouse 
movement would be tracked.  
4. Results 
4.1. Demographics and Descriptives 
 
The sample included 39.91% women, 6.31% 
Hispanic, 6.84% Asian, 11.75% African or African 
American, and 1.66% other non-Caucasian 
participants, and were an average age of 36.0. Figure 
3 provides a descriptive visualization of the average 
response and level of lying about each data type 
requested. As a reminder, we use an absolute value of 




Figure 3. Lying by Data Type 
4.2. Measurement Model 
We estimated the reliability, convergent and 
discriminant validity, covariance, and common 
methods bias of the final sample. Table 3 summarizes 
the results and indicates that each scale had sufficient 
reliability (α > 0.7) [45]. Convergent validity is 
sufficient when composite reliability (CR) is over 0.7 
and the average variance extracted (AVE) is over 0.5 
for each scale [46]. All criteria were met.  
Covariance was tested by calculating the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) for each exogenous construct. 
Every VIF score was below the recommended cutoff 
of 10.0 [47]. 
 
Table 3. Reliability, Validity, and Covariance 
  BIM BPR PC RIM RPR SD α C.R. VIF 
BIM 0.69 0.78 -0.04 -0.17 0.04 -0.04 0.79 0.87 2.556 
BPR 0.60 0.70 -0.02 -0.14 0.04 -0.03 0.79 0.87 2.506 
PC 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.57 0.72 -0.12 0.77 0.87 2.249 
RIM 0.03 0.02 0.32 0.81 0.58 -0.13 0.77 0.89 1.712 
RPR 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.33 0.73 -0.16 0.81 0.89 2.347 
SD 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.63 0.75 0.84 1.031 
Notes: AVEs along the diagonal, correlations above, 
squared correlations below 
 
Discriminant validity is sufficient when the AVE 
for each reflective construct is greater than that 
construct’s squared correlation with every other factor. 
This criterion was also met as each number in the 
diagonal (bolded and underlined) is greater than each 
of the values below it. In summary, we conclude that 
the data exhibited sufficient measurement model 
quality. 
4.3. Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis testing was performed using a partial 
least squares (PLS) based structural equation model 
(SEM) in SmartPLS 3.0 [48]. This was appropriate 
because our measure of accurate disclosure is 
formative representing the combined accuracy across 
all data types (height, weight, drugs, prescriptions, 
smoking, alcohol, sex, sleep, exercise) and subjects 
may be willing to lie more or less depending on the 
sensitivity of each data type to them personally. Our 
model was tested first using their stated responses 
indicating how much they lied after learning of the true 
nature of the study and second using the mouse 
tracking data. Both measures were reversed to frame 
the endogenous variable as the accuracy of disclosure 
rather than the extent of lying. 
  
 
Figure 4. Coefficients & P-values for Stated Lying 
The stated lying/accuracy model indicates that all 
relationships were significant. However, the effect of 
perceived risk probability (β = -0.146, p < 0.001) and 
impact (β = -0.228, p < 0.001) was much higher than 
those of perceived benefits probability (β = 0.095, p < 
0.01) and impact (β = 0.086, p < 0.05). Despite these 
differences, all hypotheses are supported by this stated 
accuracy model. The overall model explained 16.4 
percent of the variance in accurate disclosure. 
To estimate our model using mouse tracking data, 
three measures were combined in a formative 
construct representing the accuracy of disclosure: 
mouse distance, slower speed, and total time to answer 
[20]. A separate model was estimated for each type of 
health data since different people are more or less 
likely to lie about different types of data. These models 
also include the demographic variables and two other 
control variables: social desirability (SD) and their 
initial response to each data type. However, for 
simplicity, we only show the relationships of the four 
sub-constructs of interest—RIM, RPR, BIM, and 




Table 4. Coefficients for Mouse Tracking Models 
 BIM BPR RIM RPR R2 
Alcohol -0.156† 0.134† -0.078† -0.114† 15.2% 
Drugs  0.053 0.033 -0.028 -0.129* 12.3% 
Exercise -0.071 0.016 -0.065 -0.166** 11.0% 
Height -0.170 0.158* -0.106* -0.142* 6.2% 
Overdose -0.182* 0.127† -0.003 -0.092 6.8% 
Sex -0.130 0.140† -0.094* -0.044 11.6% 
Sleep -0.119† 0.073 -0.079† -0.182** 8.8% 
Smoke -0.092 0.003 -0.046 -0.083† 11.1% 
Weight -0.201 0.157* -0.087† -0.044 5.9% 
 
Across the nine types of health data collected, 
BIM had a significant (or partially significant) effect 
on three of them (alcohol, prescription drug overdoses, 
and sleep), BPR on five, RIM on five, and RPR on six. 
These results agree with the stated measure of lying 
visualized in Figure 4 with one very interesting 
exception. For the significant relationships, those of 
BIM, RIM, and RPR significantly reduced accurate 
disclosure while those of BPR increased lying. In 
summary, H1a, H2b. 
Although not included in Table 4, the 
demographics and controls also exhibited some 
significant relationships. Generally speaking across 
the data types, younger participants, non-Caucasian 
ethnicities, and men were more likely to disclose 
accurate health information based on the mouse 
tracking data. Income and education had no effect. 
5. Discussion 
Our study contributes two primary findings for 
both 1) the healthcare data domain, and 2) privacy 
calculus theory. First, both the stated response 
measures of accuracy and the mouse tracking 
measures suggest that perceived disclosure risks are 
more correlated with accurate health data disclosure 
than perceived disclosure benefits. Based on the 
TPB/TRA assumption of specificity, we interpret this 
to mean that the impact and probability of perceived 
privacy risks are easier to conceptualize for patients 
than are the benefits of disclosure. This is likely to be 
a continual issue for health data disclosure because 
patients typically do not know what diagnoses, 
treatment, or expected success will be at the time they 
are asked to disclose their health data. Therefore, it is 
difficult for them to accurately conceptualize the 
benefits of disclosing accurate information, causing it 
to have a weaker effect on actual disclosure behavior.  
Second, we found that the perceived impacts 
versus probabilities of both risks and benefits do not 
always agree as hypothesized. For example, based on 
the mouse tracking data, the perceived BIM of 
disclosing alcohol, prescription overdoses, and sleep 
data significantly decreased the accuracy of disclosed 
information rather than increasing it as expected in 
H2b.  
We believe this is a phenomenon that is unique to 
the healthcare context. Unlike the mobile app context 
referenced above, it is quite difficult to estimate and 
conceptualize exactly how a specific disclosure will 
result in a specific health benefit. For example, an 
alcoholic in relapse may not want to hear that he or she 
will need to give up their alcohol. They may believe 
that if the clinician knows the extent of their alcohol 
consumption, they are more likely to make an accurate 
diagnosis that is reflective of their alcohol problem. 
Therefore, the more they believe that accurate alcohol 
disclosure will lead to an accurate and impactful 
diagnosis, the more likely they are to lie about their 
true consumption.  
Clearly, our suggested implication needs further 
research to be validated. However, if true, our study 
reveals a critical need to update privacy calculus 
theory. Its current formulation does not sufficiently 
specify risks and benefits by breaking them into their 
component parts of impact and probability, which is 
requisite for explaining much of seemingly ‘irrational’ 
consumer behavior. Also, if true, the implication for 
healthcare practice is that interventions may be needed 
to encourage more accurate health data disclosure 
which could end up saving lives.  
5.2. Limitations and Future Research 
Our study and results offer many opportunities for 
future research. Concerning our research design, 
although we improved the external validity of our 
results by deceiving participants, they never had to 
disclose their name or identity in the initial survey. 
Future designs should make the disclosure risks 
greater to see if our results are consistent. 
Given that patients are more likely to lie if they 
believe that benefits will be impactful, it would be very 
useful to test various treatments in an experimental 
design to see if this effect can be reversed to encourage 
greater accuracy. 
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